Wednesday, 12 September 2012

My semi-private conversation with a Swoy-parast (Separatist). Guest post by Sualeh Keen




There is this Swoy-parast[1] who lives somewhere near Greenland. Not necessarily the island; it could be the figurative cloud cuckoo land where everything is green — from the chaddi to the notional flag. This particular Swoy-parast is not a Kashmiri, but occupies (no pun intended) a bully pulpit from where abusive intercontinental speeches are pelted at Kashmiri nay-sayers like me, what with the Swoy-parast having written a book on Kashmir, which is all it takes to obtain authority and to bully Kashmiri skeptics.

The Swoy-parast spends hours concocting an elaborate apologia couched in Leftist jargon of swoy-parasitism, wherein ‘Nizam-e-Most Awful’ is a Utopian State where acid gets ‘accidentally’ spilled on uncovered female faces and the ‘Klashkoofy[2]’ of 1990 is an ‘innocuous’ chor-police game played by ‘innocent’ kids that would put those kids of Lord of the Flies fame to shame.

Anyway, this Swoy-parast and I were added to a tiny secret Facebook group by a mutual Facebook friend for a mysterious reason only Mark Zuckerberg would know about. What follows is my last semi-private conversation in the group with the Swoy-parast on 15th August:

SWOY-PARAST: [posts] Joke of the day – “Happy Independence Day!”

ME: LOL

SWOY-PARAST: Really LOL or are you being sarcastic?

SWOY-PARAST: Anyway, thanks for this breather. I am completely exhausted fighting with you on that Inqalaab (revolution) thread.

[So easily exhausted, I thought. Age is showing on this warrior. Apparently, using photos from younger days as profile pictures has not been working. 

The Inqalaab (Inka Laab, as against Sabka Laab) was a Facebook thread where the swoy-parast brigade suffered a series of humiliations from yours faithfully, a thread whose sharing permissions have since been restricted. “Lest The Reek[3]  earn a bad name.” What’s in a name? quoth the Bard. That which we call The Reek, by any other name would smell as putrid. 

[The Reek is the ostensibly ‘human rights’ struggle to form Islamic Republic of Kashmir (IRKsome State) and/or the struggle to merge Muslim-majority Kashmir Valley with Pakistan. Please note that The Reek has no connection with the Nazi Reich, yet, though a seemingly liberal swoy-parast comrade has suggested doing a Subhas Chandra Bose and seeking the help of Hilter’s ghost. Like I have always maintained, “History is not a science; it is a séance.”]

ME: [responding to the comment on Independence Day joke] Not sarcastic. It is really a good one, since there is no such thing as ‘independence’; only ‘interdependence’.

SWOY-PARAST: Let us cut the nonsense. I despise your position on Kashmir and I hate all the semi-literate sheep that you herd in your Moderate group. 

But Sualeh, you, you I can be friends with...

[Damn, I thought. The Swoy-parast wants to buddy with me! And to take me to Swoy-parast rave parties where I’d be made to smoke what they do and share their visions! Ah, the ol’ ploy of cunning (Unhappiness) Factory Bosses of compromising the Workers’ Union Leader the Swoy-parast thinks I am. But, no problem: I’m comfortable being friends with people whose political positions I disagree with, for my fight is against an ideology (a theology, actually) and not against individuals.

But I wondered if this Swoy-parast would express the desire to buddy with me in an open forum in front of all swoy-parast comrades... Hmm...]

SWOY-PARAST: Do you even know how despicable the semi-literate Moderate sheep you herd are? How horrible? How dirty?

ME: See, I am no herder or leader and I am not responsible for the actions and words of other people.

[What’s with the snooty semi-literate semi-literate jibes? I wondered. In the case of this particular Swoy-parast, I could barely make a distinction between Ivy League and Poison Ivy. I would any day trade off any academic degree for a saner mind and better perspective. Perhaps this Swoy-parast had assumed that I am highly literate and wanted to use that to fill me with contempt for the members of Moderate group whom the Swoy-parast has assumed to be ‘semi-literate’. The dukhtaraan (daughters) of assumption! For the record, I am not even Post-graduate.]

SWOY-PARAST: And I don’t know how you can cozy up with those two horrors. And I feel it is not worthwhile to speak with someone who can be friends with those two.

[This was it. It is one thing trying to befriend me, but it was abysmally low, even for a swoy-parast, to try to create a wedge between me and my two best friends who are among the most wonderful humanists, secularists and rationalists I know. 

And I marvelled at the human capacity for self-deception. As I mentioned earlier, my fight is against an ideology and not against individuals. And the Swoy-parast was also saying “Sualeh, you, you I can be friends with,” despite despising my political position on Kashmir. Then what Karakashi logic is it to expect that I will dump two good friends whose ideology also matches with mine, for someone who keeps abusing me, despises my position, and has an ideology I am against? :-/ Yet another utopia. 

It was getting clearer with each passing day that swoy-parasitism is a psychiatric problem and cannot be addressed through logic and rationality.]

ME: //And I feel it is not worthwhile to speak with someone who can be friends with those two.//

If this is your last speech, good.

SWOY-PARAST: Also, you so gleefully agreed with that Peekay[4] man in the Moderate group.

[The man the Swoy-parast mentioned is a small fry in one of the many inebriated factions of Peekay, another swoy-parast organisation formed by right-wing Kashmiri Pandits as a counterweight to The Reek after the exodus of the Pandit minority community due to Islamist ‘Kalashkoofy’. And this Peekay man is a masochistic Khunza Kokur (plucked chicken) who keeps returning to the Moderate group for daily grilling.

Does my commenting on the Pakistani News link that the plucked chicken posted amount to me being in cohorts with Peekay, an organisation we grill in white wine marinade on a daily basis, the same Peekay that considers Moderate group as Adversary No.2, the first being The Reek? Often, accusations of bias emanate from biased perceptions. Being a Moderate means being accused by both swoy-parast extremist camps for batting for the opposite camp. This predicament of the admins of the Moderate group reminds me of the Kashmiri saying: Passis kharaan poss; gharawaalis doshwaiy (One guest dislikes the other guest, but the host dislikes them both).]

ME: Yes I did agree with the contents of the Pakistani article that he posted.

SWOY-PARAST: Ha! That makes you a sick and compromised poor little soul.

ME: But I have also agreed with you occasionally.

SWOY-PARAST: Ha! When was that? Wouldn’t I remember then? Huh?

ME: [after searching the archives] Here is the link to a Moderate thread. < link to MVJKL thread > As you can see, I agreed there with the bulk of the facts in your article, though I had reservation about a couple of factoids that contradicted the bulk of the facts I had agreed with. Does that simple agreement make me a swoy-parast as well? I am a rationalist who will agree with some fact no matter who says it, strictly on a case-to-case basis.

And if you notice, you were being extremely abusive on that thread against group members. But I, as an admin of Moderate group, defended you though you did not deserve the special treatment. The thing is, I was aware of your habit of playing the chest-thumping ‘victim’ after being confronted for your abusiveness and of your habit of running to your wall and weeping on the shoulders of swoy-parast comrades, saying how horrible the people in the Moderate group are. 

Nonetheless, my treating you with kid gloves was futile. After pelting a volley of abuses, you flew to your perch on your Facebook wall and rained tears and extracted solidarity from your Islamist comrades. Bad habits die hard.

SWOY-PARAST: [No answer. Leaves the semi-private group.]

......

Epilogue:

A little bird told me that a post appeared on the Swoy-parast’s personal wall that is inaccessible to me: 

//“Sualeh Keen: You so gleefully agreed with that Peekay man in the Moderate group! You hypocrite! Do you really think you have any credibility left when you associate with such known bigots? Who are you, then, to raise fingers at figures in the azadi movement and call them "fundamentalists"? I dare you to discuss this with me!”//

I was reminded of the lyrics of Megadeth’s Sweating Bullets: “Well, me... it's nice talking to myself.” In hindsight, which is always 20/20, the whole song seems apt. But I am not surprised. Bad habits die hard. 

And I am happy for the plucked chicken; he is becoming famous among the swoy-parasts. He may yet become the general secretary of his 5-member Peekay faction. I can already hear him clucking in happiness: PK PK PKKKAAAKK (Here PK can stand for Peekay or for Pakistan — take you PicK.)

P.S.

Please don’t ask me who this Swoy-parast is. Thank you in advance. I don’t like to play dirty. And I am not going to reveal her name. 

P.P.S.

I have a feeling that the swoy-parasts, overly-optimistic used-car salespeople as they are, would send yet another head-hunter my way, to try to seduce me to their side. You see, people who have faith in a utopia never give up, despite all evidence towards the contrary. Each fool is replaced by another fool who thinks she/he can achieve the impossible and that the previous one was, well, a fool, and tries to chase the same mirage again and again... ad infinitum, ad nauseum. 

However, hoping against hope that the swoy-parasts utilise their time in polishing the marble of their castles in air and not waste it in trying to conscript me in their deluded ranks, I dedicate a song to them. Hope they get the message loud and clear (it is repeated again and again in the song, just in case they miss it :) 

Terms (Courtesy- Sualeh Keen):

1. ^ Swoy in Kashmiri means stinging nettle. And swoy-parast means a worshipper of that. There is a Kashmiri saying, "Anyim swoy, vowum swoy, lajyim swoy panasee" (I brought the nettle, I sowed the nettle, I only was stung by the nettle). Ergo, the separatists started an violent armed uprising and now that their militancy was crushed leaving so many dead, they are crying and saying, 'Foul! This is human rights violation!'

2. ^ Kalashkoofy means Militancy. Militants were armed with Kalashnikovs (AK-47's). Kalashkoofy is a portmanteau of Kalashnikov and Bewakoofy (stupidity). This was coined by local folk artists to refer to militancy.

3. ^ The Reek is a pun of Tehreek(e-Azadi).

4. ^ Peekay is a pun of Panun Kashmir

Wednesday, 11 July 2012

Kashmir's torture trail speaks volumes



Kashmir’s torture trail, a documentary program aired by UK’s Channel 4, is a sombre compilation of the gruesome stories detailing the systematic use of torture against the people in the Indian administered Kashmir by the state authorities in the backdrop of a bloody territorial war that has gripped this picturesque Himalayan region. 

The documentary spins around a heroic lawyer fighting passionately for justice to the victims. A gut-wrenching account of torture that includes stories about flesh being sliced off from body and then victims made to eat that is certainly going to make a spectator wriggle hands with nausea and cringe back with the horror.

It takes us to a terrifying rendezvous with the ground reality about the ignominy and humiliations these tortured victims had faced but the documentary occasionally goes hyperbolic with its gaudy and hackneyed descriptions of India’s ostensibly bullyragging military might in Kashmir.

Distressing, the stories in the video depicts the harrowing path these people, facing abuse at the hands of the state, have to take.

Elsewhere, an interview with a woman who is suspected of having links with the militants, tells her plaintive experience when two cops had ran a nail-fitted roller over her hands and legs followed by an anticipated rape –  all this in her teen hood , gives goose-bumps.

These stories are the grim reminder how army in Kashmir have miserably failed to uphold human rights while battling the insurgency and how its clumsy gov’t stood helpless in bringing to justice the rogue forces that perpetrated the crimes.

The biggest obstacle to justice has been this law: Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA). Tossed by many as draconian, the law gives a certain amount of impunity to the security forces from prosecution.  “But the problem is not the law; problem is the unaccountability in the system” a high ranking police officer in the state told me once. There is a provision that allows guilty men to be sentenced only if the central gov’t permits. But that permission is rarely given.

Earlier this year, The Hindu reported that in the past four years alone India’s Home Ministry has shot down at least 42 such requests citing “lazy and shoddy” investigation by police.  

Kashmir is recovering from the conflict but scars of injustice still remain.  It is presently savoring an uncanny spell of peace govt tries to maintain, lock stock and barrel. Just as one can assume from the documentary, most of Kashmiri Muslims are bitterly opposed to the Indian rule. From distant corners of the web world to the streets and alleyways of Kashmir, they have unambiguously tried to give out this message: “We are not Indian’s.”

A full blown insurgency that begun in early 90’s drove a communal wedge between the revolting Muslims and the Pandits who forms the indigenous Hindu minority. What we see today is the aftermath of the gory war that ensued 90’s rebellion leading to deaths, destruction and desolation. Adding to the plight, justice still eludes the victims terrorized by the state forces and the militants, alike. Kashmir’s torture trail is yet another attempt highlighting the hardships of many Kashmiri’s caught between the tight grip of conflict's pincers and does go a long way in striking the moral chords.


Tuesday, 12 June 2012

In Kashmir, a deafening calm struggles to define itself


In the book they recently released, The Meadow, British authors Adrian Levy and Cathy Scott-Clark, aptly elucidates the first scenes of Kashmir during 90’s as being amidst of a “full scale Indian military operation: chaotic jumble of sandbags, concrete barriers and barbed wire, the roads jammed with armoured vehicles of all descriptions, around which the Indian soldiers milled.” The protagonists in his book apparently stood agape when they saw vast convoys of Army trucks honking and drumming aside everyone who comes in their way – they had arrived in what was quintessentially a ‘war zone’.

For years people living in this part of the world have been smitten by the brunt of the deadly war fought between India’s repressive military force and Islamist militants who agitate for a separate statehood.  The barbarity of the conflict has rendered thousands dead, wounded, bruised, maimed, homeless and traumatized.  The figures about dead people floating in the collective beliefs oscillate between 40,000 to 100,000 – with different people trotting out a different number depending upon their political leanings.

But today, the Valley of Kashmir stands out completely in a different state, gracefully defying this bleak description it epitomized in all these two decades of bloodletting. It can be witnessed limping into an inexplicable bout of tranquility which Indian commentators describe as ‘normalcy’ and critics as ‘desolation’; its people scraping out a living with little care to grenade attacks, shoot-outs  and crack downs that once were as rife as the dawn and dusk.

A slew of steps by the Indian state, ranging from boosting an urban sprawl in the summer capital Srinagar to rolling back of sand-bag military bunkers, has tried to ensure that the region is yanked from the gloom of mutiny and bloodshed.  But sentiment of seceding from India hasn’t waned. Kashmiri’s still notoriously object to the perfunctory referral of J&K as a ‘part of India’.  They argue why the cops involved in 2010 murderous street rage haven’t been brought to justice.

Meanwhile, a bewildering passion of state’s voters to defy secessionists’ poll boycott calls, who otherwise are revered leaders, hasn’t too ebbed.  Just last year thousands of people queued up in long endless columns to vote in the regional hamlet polls or Panchayat elections, braving warnings and the searing summer heat.  

Srinagar is not the same as it was some years back. The multitude of Indian soldiers, donning olive green fatigues and outdated helmets, no more stroll around the historic city center of Lal Chowk. A sudden vacation of the Palladium cinema by India’s central reserve forces near the area after a gap of 15 years was widely welcomed. Presence of Bunkers, temporary structures made up of the heaps of sand-bags that security forces once used as bulwarks, has considerably lessened in and around many parts of the region. The sprawling roads that pass through the city looks spruced up. Srinagar also has traffic lights now whose work was outsourced to South African engineers. Tourist hordes flocking into the valley are also unprecedented with hotel occupancy shooting up to the level of ‘no vacancy’

But even all this hasn’t helped the state govt, just like any other govt in the world, to fend off a public ire. Authorities in J&K have been in the eye of a storm for quite some time over two conspicuous problems: A ghastly menace of serial dog-biting incidents and an infant death scare at a local hospital, GB Pant, located at the Srinagar outskirts.  But these issues do not relate to conflict, therefore has little to do in undermining this spell of peace the region is basking.

But all these cannot been taken as anecdotes that the conflict is dying. There are still people who organize sit-in protests at the exquisite Pratap Park at the center of Srinagar, holding tight with their chests, the pictures of their relatives allegedly disappeared after being picked up by police and Indian soldiers.  Still a fervent appeal of strike by Syed Ali Shah Geelani, a secessionist demagogue, has a big chunk of takers.  Young boys wearing bandanas still chuck stones occasionally at the cops risking the law and order seriously, as police alleges.  Still the state police driven by their gnawing feel of anxiety about the unknown, ends up arresting and locking down dozens over even the most benign protests. The condemned laws like AFSPA are still in place.

Kashmir’s current political landscape is being mottled by the schisms emerging within the separatist headships. Kashmir interlocutors, an Indian-appointed conversationist trio that were to schmooze talks between Kashmir’s and the Indian leadership, too have become the subjects of denigration in the state.

Al though there are no serious evidences to assume that this period, characterized by dwindling violence and increasing normalcy, is perpetual but none of political infighting, feisty internet commentary, frantic secessionist demonstrations and an Indian-style interlocution has thus far been able to bog it down.








Wednesday, 4 January 2012

Maoist-hit areas doesn't merit for AFSPA

An brutal beheading of a person in Jharkhand who was couched as a police informer marks the first incident of violence by Maoist insurgents in the year 2012. According to this Hindustan Times report: "The headless body was recovered  near a river bridge at Gamaria Raja bazaar and the victim's head was found after a search of the area during the day." It further says, "A leaflet left by guerrillas read that similar would be the fate of police informers."

It is the latest installment in the string of attacks carried out by India's Left Wing Extremists (LWT's). Maoist violence is one of many the widespread insurgencies India faces apart from the ones in Jammu & Kashmir and Northeastern states. Prime Minister Manmohan Singh is on record to describe it as the "biggest threat India has to its internal security."

From the past couple of years, Govt have been making strides in its attempts to stamp out the Maoist violence. Not only has the counter-insurgency operations been successful in dwindling the number of areas under the Maoist control but many of the organisations' top leaders also have been eliminated. But Indian state is yet to weed out the Maoist problem completely. A large number of Indian police and paramilitary are still battling the insurgents in the states effected by this menace. There is no full guarantee that India would vanquish the problem once and for all, for now or in the near future.

On the other hand, the insurgencies of India's northeastern states and J&K, have almost, if not completely, been wiped out.  Apart from a better counter-insurgency grid, the success in those areas is mostly attributed this thing - Armed Forces Special Powers Act. The law, which India uses as a last ditch effort to calm the mutinies, has been a bone of contention between the Indian govt and the opponents of it. According to the legislation, armed forces can conduct search raids, destroy property and even shoot a person just on the mere suspicion - and this with total legal impunity. However, permission to prosecute the alleged personnel can be sanctioned by the central govt but only after the accusations are proved not to be false. Those permissions are rarely given.

The idea of AFSPA and India's ongoing bloody engagement with Maoists has led many to raise this likely question: Why can't AFSPA be employed to defeat Maoists? The answer to this is simply, No !

Comparing the insurgencies of J&K and Northeastern states with the Naxalism would  be the worst thing one could ever imagine. There are no parallels between them. Militancy in Kashmir and the one in Northeast can be compared slightly though. But to draw a similarity with Maoist problem just doesn't fits the picture.

Consider this: J&K is geographically situated at the northern fringe of India. It shares its borders with two most hostile adversaries India has fought multiple wars with - Pakistan & China. What's more? Not only does Pakistan claims the state wholly but China also claims substantial a part of it. Stakes there, are very much high.

In J&K, out of the many militant groups operating, only one is indigenous to the state ie. Hizbul Mujahideen. Rest of all are festered and pushed across LOC by Pakistani establishment.  Here is the detailed report by Peter Chalk of RAND Corporation investigating the extent of Pakistan's support to militants groups of Kashmir.

Same is the case with militancy in the northeastern states. They lie on the edge of Indian state and are in the close proximity of China, of which a threat looms large on them. Insurgents of those areas also get support generally from outside India. Take a look at this report by Wasbir Hussain where he explores how NE militants largely get bases to thrive in countries like Myanmar and Bangladesh.

Now in contrast to this, Maoists generally get trained and armed from within India. For financial support, they rely of a range of things from looting Police stations to extorting money from NGO's. Many of them although are helped by NE militants, which can be cited to signify an external support, but that is too little to make a case of bringing them at par with militants of NE or J&K.

Secondly, the AFSPA was invoked in J&K and Northeast only when it was realised that local Police and other security forces were being overwhelmed. In Maoist areas, the number of forces taking on the insurgents are very huge and are very unlikely to be overwhelmed notwithstanding the incidents like Dantewanda. Apart from the large number of SPO's fighting them, there are 73 battalions of Central Paramilitay Forces (CPF), 31 Indian Reserve (IR) battalions and 6 battalions of the special Commando Battalions for Resolute Action (CoBRA), who are engaging the Maoists.  The government of India has also started a news strategy of 'clear, hold and develop', according to which forces would oversee the govt-led development of the zones that are cleared off the Maoist control.

In conclusion, the situation of Maoist areas is grave though, but not as serious that would merit it for imposition of AFSPA. Having said this, one should not assume that the narrative justifies the continuance of AFSPA in the states like J&K. If the numbers by the govt are to be trusted, the insurgency in J&K is at all time low. Not only this, a recent statement by states' DGP, where in he declared districts like Srinagar and Budgam as 'militancy free' regions, also makes a clear case for AFSPA withdrawal. The culture of impunity that AFSPA has generated in those regions have also taken a toll on the local populace. And at least now, they do deserve a better life to live in.

Tuesday, 13 December 2011

All you need to know about Mullaperiyar

It was in 1789 when Pradani Muthirulappa Pillai, minister of Ramnad king Muthuramalinga Sethupathy, explored a unique idea of harnessing of westward flowing water from Periyar, longest river of Kerala originating from Sivagiri hills, by diverting its course to join the Vaigai river of the erstwhile Madras presidency (present day Tamil Nadu).

For years, after meeting several feasibility related bottlenecks, it was finally in 1882 when the mammoth project was approved. On October 1886, a lease agreement was signed between then Maharaja of Travancore Visakham Thirunal Rama Verma and the British Secretary of State for India for Periyar Irrigation Works. 

The agreement provided British with the sweeping rights over the region for all the construction and irrigations works.  The Mullahperiyar project is located at the confluence of the river Periyar and Mullayar at Thaddakay point in India’s southern state of Kerala. Its construction was finally completed in 1895, nine years after its conception. Although located in Kerala, the Mullahperiyar dam is operated by the Govt in Tamil Nadu.

The project envisaged creating a huge reservoir at Thaddkay from which the river Periyar would be diverted eastwards via a subterranean tunnel to join Vaigai river. The proposed dam on Vaigai would then be used to irrigate the areas of Madras presidency that were in a dire need of water.

At present the water flow from Thaddakay Lake, through a tunnel, joins Forebay dam at Errachipalam in Tamil Nadu from where the stream is channeled to run a 175 MW capacity Periyar Power Station that caters to the power needs of Tamil Nadu.

A tussle between the state of Kerala and Tamil Nadu over the project dates back to 1979 when an accident at Morvi dam killed nearly 25, 000 people. Kerala is mainly concerned over the safety of what it says is an ageing dam.

The Govt Agencies like Center for Earth and Science Studies (CESS), IIT – Roorkee and IISc have maintained in their respective reports that the dam is built in a seismic zone and would collapse in case an earthquake measuring 6 on the Richter scale strucks putting millions of lives at risk of being swept with the biblical floods. Tamil Nadu is playing down any such concerns arguing that some fortifications would make it function like any normal present day dam.

Adding to the tension is the Kerala’s proposal to build a new dam on Mullahperiyar. The demand of Tamil Nadu is to implement Supreme Court’s decision of 2006 on the issue where it called to reverse the orders of Center Water Commission passed in 1979, according to which Tamil Nadu was obliged to bring down the water level of the dam from 142 to 136 feet. It is this demand, parties like DMK are staging protests and dharnas for, citing the agricultural losses.

To counter the apex court’s decision, Kerala promulgated Irrigation and Water Conservation (Amendment) Act in 2006 that justified lowering of water levels in the dam. The law has also enabled Kerala to condemn the Mullaperiyar as ‘endangered dam’ and pave way for the construction of new dam - a move that Tamil Nadu opposes.

In 2009, Tamil Nadu Govt got a double whammy when Supreme Court rejected its plea against the environmental clearance, Kerala got from the Ministry of Envoirnment and Forests for the new dam on the Mullakperiyar, it planned to build.

Following concerns over the intensifying standoff between the two states, Supreme Court in February 2010 ordered to constitute a five-membered Empowered committee headed by former chief justice A.S Anand to study all the issues related to Mullahperiyar dam and give report within 6 months. The decision is opposed by Tamil Nadu’s ruling parties.

After criticism by Supreme Court on its alleged reticence on funding the “Empowered Committee”, Center government extended its (committee’s) terms for the further period of six months, namely till April 30, 2012.
In the present scenario, it is highly unlikely to assume that the standoff is going to end in the near future. The ruling AIADMK led by J Jayalalitha has called for a special assembly session on the 15 December on the issue while government is Kerala is equally adamant not to budge over creating a new dam on Mullaperiyar.

Wednesday, 26 October 2011

Kashmir's Afghanistan conundrum





In 1839, the British Empire sought to expand the borders of its colony of British India, by launching a war of conquest against the neighboring Pashtuns. The Pashtuns, as a fiercely independent tribal warrior people, resisted ferociously, so that the British conquest of them was not successful. The British were only able to conquer part of the Pashtun territory, and even that remained in constant rebellion against them. Meanwhile, the remaining unconquered portion of Pashtun territory became the nucleus for the formation of Afghanistan. In 1893, the British imposed a ceasefire line on the Afghans called the Durand Line, which separated British-controlled territory from Afghan territory. The local people on the ground however never recognized this line, which merely existed on a map, and not on the ground.

In 1947, when the colony of British India achieved independence and was simultaneously partitioned into Pakistan and India, the Pakistanis wanted the conquered Pashtun territory to go to them, since the Pashtuns were Muslims. Given that the Pashtuns never recognized British authority over them to begin with, the Pakistanis had tenuous relations with the Pashtuns and were consumed by fears of Pashtun secession.

When Pakistan applied to join the UN in 1947, there was only one country which voted against it. No, it wasn't India - it was Pashtun-ruled Afghanistan which voted against Pakistan's admission, on the grounds that Pakistan was in illegal occupation of Pashtun lands stolen by the British. Their vote was cast on September 30, 1947 and is a fact.

In 1948, in the nearby state of Kashmir, its Hindu princely ruler and Muslim political leader joined hands in deciding to make Kashmir an independent country rather than joining either Pakistan or India. Pakistan's leadership were immediately terrified of this precedent, fearing that the Pashtuns would soon follow suit and also declare their own ethnically independent state. In order to pre-empt that and prevent it from happening, Pakistan's founder and leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah quickly decided to raise the cry of "Hindu treachery against the Muslims" and despatched hordes of armed Pashtun tribesmen to attack Kashmir.

This was his way of distracting the Pashtuns from their own ethnic nationalism by diverting them into war against Kashmir "to save Islam". These are the same Pashtun tribesman whose descendants are today's Taliban. Fleeing the unprovoked invasion of their homeland, Kashmir's Hindu prince and Muslim political leader went to India, pledging to merge with it if India would help repel the invasion. India agreed, and sent its army to repel the Pashtun invasion. Pakistan then sent its army to clash with Indian forces, and the result was Indo-Pakistani conflict, which has lasted for decades.

Pakistan's fear of Pashtun nationalism and separatism, which it fears can break up Pakistan, is thus the root of the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir and also the root of Pak conflict with Afghanistan, not any alleged Indian takeover of Kabul. This is all due to the legacy of 1839, which happened long before Pakistan was even created.

When a communist revolution happened in Kabul in the late 70s, Pakistan's fear of potential spillover effects on Pashtun nationalism caused Pakistan to embark on fomenting a guerrilla war against Kabul that led to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Aligned with with the USA, Pakistan then proceeded to arm the Pashtuns while indoctrinating them with religious fanaticism. The USA was not allowed any ground role, and was told it could only supply arms and funds to Pakistan, which would take care of the rest. Pakistan then simultaneously embarked on destabilization of India by fomenting insurgency there.

After the Soviets withdrew, Pakistan again feared that the well-armed Pashtuns would turn on it and pursue secession. So Pakistan then created the Taliban as a new umbrella movement for the fractious factional guerrilla groups under an ultra-fundamentalist ideology. Bin Laden's AlQaeda then became cosy with Taliban, and the result was 9-11.

When the 9/11 attacks occurred, the cornered Pakistanis then did a 180 and promised to help the US defeat the Taliban and bring the terrorists to justice. Meanwhile they were racking their brains hoping to come up with a way to undermine the War on Terror from within. Now that they have succeeded in doing that, and in bleeding US/NATO forces, they hope to jump horses by kicking the US out and aligning with China.

Because of Pakistan's attempts to illegitimately hang onto Pashtun land, it has brought itself into conflicts with so many countries - first against its neighbors and then against more distant larger powers. This is the reason why Pakistan is an irredentist state and can never be an ally against extremism, because Pakistan depends on this very extremism as a national glue to hold itself together, and keep nationalistic ethnic groups like the Pashtuns from breaking Pakistan apart.
  • Not credited to this blogger

Thursday, 14 April 2011

How Will the Situation in Syria Turn Out? - Guest post by Fredrick Misleh.


Over the past week or so, the situation in Syria has deteriorated drastically. Hundreds have died and reports of massacres have swirled. Amid these deaths and reported massacres, the embattled leader of Syria, Bashar al-Assad, has given a speech that promised reforms, ordered his security forces to put down the peaceful protesters, and been called “a reformer” by key Obama administration National Security Council members. He has promised to explore the option of ending the fifty-year long emergency laws; at the same time, however, he has used that emergency law to justify the brutal crackdown by his security forces.

So where does Syria go from here? Many fear that President al-Assad will drop his “reformist” image and take a page out of his father’s playbook. When Hafez al-Assad, the father of the current president, faced similar protests against his reign in 1982 in the city of Hama, he ordered his artillery corps to destroy the town. Unlike when former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak ordered his military to fire on the protesters in January, the Syrian Army bombarded the city. Anywhere from 17,000 to 40,000 civilians were killed.

The real question is not whether or not President al-Assad is a “reformer,” as we know he’s not. The real question is what will the military do? Depending on which course of action the Syrian Armed Forces take, we could see another Egypt or, God forbid, another Libya.

The reason why former President Mubarak fell quickly and with relatively little bloodshed (compared to Libya) was because the military disobeyed their orders and did not fire on the protesters. When former President Mubarak realized that his military was opposed to him (a former Egyptian Air Force officer himself), he attempted to hold out in his palace. Then the Egyptian Army launched a coup d’état and removed him from power, and part one (the removal of the dictator) of the Egyptian Revolution was complete.

On the opposite end of the spectrum, in Libya, the majority of the Libyan Armed Forces chose to stay with their Colonel. This has led to a divided Libya, Western intervention, and other Arab autocrats still in power using this crisis in order to draw Western criticisms away from their own brutalities.

What would the Syrian military do if President al-Assad were to order them against the people of Syria? My guess is the military will fragment into a mutiny of enlisted soldiers versus commissioned officers. Why? Simple demographics. The majority of the Syrian people, and the enlisted corps of the Syrian military, is Sunni Muslim. The al-Assad family, the majority of his government, and the majority of the officer corps of the Syrian military is comprised of a minority sect of Shia Islam known as Alawi. The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria could turn this into a religious struggle of Sunni Islam (which the Muslim Brotherhood adheres to) against Shia Alawi Islam.

This would not only fragment the military, but also the people. Approximately 13% of all Syrians are Shiite. Compared to the 74% Sunni population, 13% seems miniscule, however it is the second largest religious community with Christians in a close 10%. With a sect of Shia Islam currently in power, the Shiites are more likely to side with a minority sect of their own branch, rather than side with a different branch of Islam.

The Shiites will also fight to the bitter end in order to stay in power. The minority controls the majority in Syria, and because of this, the minority has much more at stake. The rule of politics in the West is “people go into politics because they have the power to get elected.” In the Middle East, that rule is changed: “people go into politics in order to obtain power.” And when one group who has traditionally been a minority and, thus, excluded from the seat of power, manages to obtain power, they tend not to want to relinquish it.

By the numbers, the Sunnis in Syria will be victorious in this revolution. The majority of the enlisted military is Sunni and will most likely defect to the side of their fellow Sunnis. This will give the people the weapons they will need to overcome those forces that remain loyal to President al-Assad. The Shia and President al-Assad’s Alawis are fighting a losing battle. It would behoove him to leave with some semblance of honor, despite his orders to use brute force against unarmed protesters.

In the end, Syria will most likely end up in a situation that is somewhat in between those Egypt and Libya. There will be a divided people, as in Libya. However, the violence will be on a much smaller scale, like that of Egypt. In other words, Syria will be another Yemen


Fredrick Misleh is Palestinian born US citizen and a freelance analyst and writer currently studying 'Global Politics' at the California State University, San Marcos.
The author can be reached at: fredrick.misleh@gmail.com