Tuesday 13 December 2011

All you need to know about Mullaperiyar

It was in 1789 when Pradani Muthirulappa Pillai, minister of Ramnad king Muthuramalinga Sethupathy, explored a unique idea of harnessing of westward flowing water from Periyar, longest river of Kerala originating from Sivagiri hills, by diverting its course to join the Vaigai river of the erstwhile Madras presidency (present day Tamil Nadu).

For years, after meeting several feasibility related bottlenecks, it was finally in 1882 when the mammoth project was approved. On October 1886, a lease agreement was signed between then Maharaja of Travancore Visakham Thirunal Rama Verma and the British Secretary of State for India for Periyar Irrigation Works. 

The agreement provided British with the sweeping rights over the region for all the construction and irrigations works.  The Mullahperiyar project is located at the confluence of the river Periyar and Mullayar at Thaddakay point in India’s southern state of Kerala. Its construction was finally completed in 1895, nine years after its conception. Although located in Kerala, the Mullahperiyar dam is operated by the Govt in Tamil Nadu.

The project envisaged creating a huge reservoir at Thaddkay from which the river Periyar would be diverted eastwards via a subterranean tunnel to join Vaigai river. The proposed dam on Vaigai would then be used to irrigate the areas of Madras presidency that were in a dire need of water.

At present the water flow from Thaddakay Lake, through a tunnel, joins Forebay dam at Errachipalam in Tamil Nadu from where the stream is channeled to run a 175 MW capacity Periyar Power Station that caters to the power needs of Tamil Nadu.

A tussle between the state of Kerala and Tamil Nadu over the project dates back to 1979 when an accident at Morvi dam killed nearly 25, 000 people. Kerala is mainly concerned over the safety of what it says is an ageing dam.

The Govt Agencies like Center for Earth and Science Studies (CESS), IIT – Roorkee and IISc have maintained in their respective reports that the dam is built in a seismic zone and would collapse in case an earthquake measuring 6 on the Richter scale strucks putting millions of lives at risk of being swept with the biblical floods. Tamil Nadu is playing down any such concerns arguing that some fortifications would make it function like any normal present day dam.

Adding to the tension is the Kerala’s proposal to build a new dam on Mullahperiyar. The demand of Tamil Nadu is to implement Supreme Court’s decision of 2006 on the issue where it called to reverse the orders of Center Water Commission passed in 1979, according to which Tamil Nadu was obliged to bring down the water level of the dam from 142 to 136 feet. It is this demand, parties like DMK are staging protests and dharnas for, citing the agricultural losses.

To counter the apex court’s decision, Kerala promulgated Irrigation and Water Conservation (Amendment) Act in 2006 that justified lowering of water levels in the dam. The law has also enabled Kerala to condemn the Mullaperiyar as ‘endangered dam’ and pave way for the construction of new dam - a move that Tamil Nadu opposes.

In 2009, Tamil Nadu Govt got a double whammy when Supreme Court rejected its plea against the environmental clearance, Kerala got from the Ministry of Envoirnment and Forests for the new dam on the Mullakperiyar, it planned to build.

Following concerns over the intensifying standoff between the two states, Supreme Court in February 2010 ordered to constitute a five-membered Empowered committee headed by former chief justice A.S Anand to study all the issues related to Mullahperiyar dam and give report within 6 months. The decision is opposed by Tamil Nadu’s ruling parties.

After criticism by Supreme Court on its alleged reticence on funding the “Empowered Committee”, Center government extended its (committee’s) terms for the further period of six months, namely till April 30, 2012.
In the present scenario, it is highly unlikely to assume that the standoff is going to end in the near future. The ruling AIADMK led by J Jayalalitha has called for a special assembly session on the 15 December on the issue while government is Kerala is equally adamant not to budge over creating a new dam on Mullaperiyar.

Wednesday 26 October 2011

Kashmir's Afghanistan conundrum





In 1839, the British Empire sought to expand the borders of its colony of British India, by launching a war of conquest against the neighboring Pashtuns. The Pashtuns, as a fiercely independent tribal warrior people, resisted ferociously, so that the British conquest of them was not successful. The British were only able to conquer part of the Pashtun territory, and even that remained in constant rebellion against them. Meanwhile, the remaining unconquered portion of Pashtun territory became the nucleus for the formation of Afghanistan. In 1893, the British imposed a ceasefire line on the Afghans called the Durand Line, which separated British-controlled territory from Afghan territory. The local people on the ground however never recognized this line, which merely existed on a map, and not on the ground.

In 1947, when the colony of British India achieved independence and was simultaneously partitioned into Pakistan and India, the Pakistanis wanted the conquered Pashtun territory to go to them, since the Pashtuns were Muslims. Given that the Pashtuns never recognized British authority over them to begin with, the Pakistanis had tenuous relations with the Pashtuns and were consumed by fears of Pashtun secession.

When Pakistan applied to join the UN in 1947, there was only one country which voted against it. No, it wasn't India - it was Pashtun-ruled Afghanistan which voted against Pakistan's admission, on the grounds that Pakistan was in illegal occupation of Pashtun lands stolen by the British. Their vote was cast on September 30, 1947 and is a fact.

In 1948, in the nearby state of Kashmir, its Hindu princely ruler and Muslim political leader joined hands in deciding to make Kashmir an independent country rather than joining either Pakistan or India. Pakistan's leadership were immediately terrified of this precedent, fearing that the Pashtuns would soon follow suit and also declare their own ethnically independent state. In order to pre-empt that and prevent it from happening, Pakistan's founder and leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah quickly decided to raise the cry of "Hindu treachery against the Muslims" and despatched hordes of armed Pashtun tribesmen to attack Kashmir.

This was his way of distracting the Pashtuns from their own ethnic nationalism by diverting them into war against Kashmir "to save Islam". These are the same Pashtun tribesman whose descendants are today's Taliban. Fleeing the unprovoked invasion of their homeland, Kashmir's Hindu prince and Muslim political leader went to India, pledging to merge with it if India would help repel the invasion. India agreed, and sent its army to repel the Pashtun invasion. Pakistan then sent its army to clash with Indian forces, and the result was Indo-Pakistani conflict, which has lasted for decades.

Pakistan's fear of Pashtun nationalism and separatism, which it fears can break up Pakistan, is thus the root of the Indo-Pakistani conflict over Kashmir and also the root of Pak conflict with Afghanistan, not any alleged Indian takeover of Kabul. This is all due to the legacy of 1839, which happened long before Pakistan was even created.

When a communist revolution happened in Kabul in the late 70s, Pakistan's fear of potential spillover effects on Pashtun nationalism caused Pakistan to embark on fomenting a guerrilla war against Kabul that led to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Aligned with with the USA, Pakistan then proceeded to arm the Pashtuns while indoctrinating them with religious fanaticism. The USA was not allowed any ground role, and was told it could only supply arms and funds to Pakistan, which would take care of the rest. Pakistan then simultaneously embarked on destabilization of India by fomenting insurgency there.

After the Soviets withdrew, Pakistan again feared that the well-armed Pashtuns would turn on it and pursue secession. So Pakistan then created the Taliban as a new umbrella movement for the fractious factional guerrilla groups under an ultra-fundamentalist ideology. Bin Laden's AlQaeda then became cosy with Taliban, and the result was 9-11.

When the 9/11 attacks occurred, the cornered Pakistanis then did a 180 and promised to help the US defeat the Taliban and bring the terrorists to justice. Meanwhile they were racking their brains hoping to come up with a way to undermine the War on Terror from within. Now that they have succeeded in doing that, and in bleeding US/NATO forces, they hope to jump horses by kicking the US out and aligning with China.

Because of Pakistan's attempts to illegitimately hang onto Pashtun land, it has brought itself into conflicts with so many countries - first against its neighbors and then against more distant larger powers. This is the reason why Pakistan is an irredentist state and can never be an ally against extremism, because Pakistan depends on this very extremism as a national glue to hold itself together, and keep nationalistic ethnic groups like the Pashtuns from breaking Pakistan apart.
  • Not credited to this blogger

Thursday 14 April 2011

How Will the Situation in Syria Turn Out? - Guest post by Fredrick Misleh.


Over the past week or so, the situation in Syria has deteriorated drastically. Hundreds have died and reports of massacres have swirled. Amid these deaths and reported massacres, the embattled leader of Syria, Bashar al-Assad, has given a speech that promised reforms, ordered his security forces to put down the peaceful protesters, and been called “a reformer” by key Obama administration National Security Council members. He has promised to explore the option of ending the fifty-year long emergency laws; at the same time, however, he has used that emergency law to justify the brutal crackdown by his security forces.

So where does Syria go from here? Many fear that President al-Assad will drop his “reformist” image and take a page out of his father’s playbook. When Hafez al-Assad, the father of the current president, faced similar protests against his reign in 1982 in the city of Hama, he ordered his artillery corps to destroy the town. Unlike when former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak ordered his military to fire on the protesters in January, the Syrian Army bombarded the city. Anywhere from 17,000 to 40,000 civilians were killed.

The real question is not whether or not President al-Assad is a “reformer,” as we know he’s not. The real question is what will the military do? Depending on which course of action the Syrian Armed Forces take, we could see another Egypt or, God forbid, another Libya.

The reason why former President Mubarak fell quickly and with relatively little bloodshed (compared to Libya) was because the military disobeyed their orders and did not fire on the protesters. When former President Mubarak realized that his military was opposed to him (a former Egyptian Air Force officer himself), he attempted to hold out in his palace. Then the Egyptian Army launched a coup d’état and removed him from power, and part one (the removal of the dictator) of the Egyptian Revolution was complete.

On the opposite end of the spectrum, in Libya, the majority of the Libyan Armed Forces chose to stay with their Colonel. This has led to a divided Libya, Western intervention, and other Arab autocrats still in power using this crisis in order to draw Western criticisms away from their own brutalities.

What would the Syrian military do if President al-Assad were to order them against the people of Syria? My guess is the military will fragment into a mutiny of enlisted soldiers versus commissioned officers. Why? Simple demographics. The majority of the Syrian people, and the enlisted corps of the Syrian military, is Sunni Muslim. The al-Assad family, the majority of his government, and the majority of the officer corps of the Syrian military is comprised of a minority sect of Shia Islam known as Alawi. The Muslim Brotherhood in Syria could turn this into a religious struggle of Sunni Islam (which the Muslim Brotherhood adheres to) against Shia Alawi Islam.

This would not only fragment the military, but also the people. Approximately 13% of all Syrians are Shiite. Compared to the 74% Sunni population, 13% seems miniscule, however it is the second largest religious community with Christians in a close 10%. With a sect of Shia Islam currently in power, the Shiites are more likely to side with a minority sect of their own branch, rather than side with a different branch of Islam.

The Shiites will also fight to the bitter end in order to stay in power. The minority controls the majority in Syria, and because of this, the minority has much more at stake. The rule of politics in the West is “people go into politics because they have the power to get elected.” In the Middle East, that rule is changed: “people go into politics in order to obtain power.” And when one group who has traditionally been a minority and, thus, excluded from the seat of power, manages to obtain power, they tend not to want to relinquish it.

By the numbers, the Sunnis in Syria will be victorious in this revolution. The majority of the enlisted military is Sunni and will most likely defect to the side of their fellow Sunnis. This will give the people the weapons they will need to overcome those forces that remain loyal to President al-Assad. The Shia and President al-Assad’s Alawis are fighting a losing battle. It would behoove him to leave with some semblance of honor, despite his orders to use brute force against unarmed protesters.

In the end, Syria will most likely end up in a situation that is somewhat in between those Egypt and Libya. There will be a divided people, as in Libya. However, the violence will be on a much smaller scale, like that of Egypt. In other words, Syria will be another Yemen


Fredrick Misleh is Palestinian born US citizen and a freelance analyst and writer currently studying 'Global Politics' at the California State University, San Marcos.
The author can be reached at: fredrick.misleh@gmail.com