An brutal beheading of a person in Jharkhand who was couched as a police informer marks the first incident of violence by Maoist insurgents in the year 2012. According to this Hindustan Times report: "The headless body was recovered near a river bridge at Gamaria Raja bazaar and the victim's head was found after a search of the area during the day." It further says, "A leaflet left by guerrillas read that similar would be the fate of police informers."
From the past couple of years, Govt have been making strides in its attempts to stamp out the Maoist violence. Not only has the counter-insurgency operations been successful in dwindling the number of areas under the Maoist control but many of the organisations' top leaders also have been eliminated. But Indian state is yet to weed out the Maoist problem completely. A large number of Indian police and paramilitary are still battling the insurgents in the states effected by this menace. There is no full guarantee that India would vanquish the problem once and for all, for now or in the near future.
On the other hand, the insurgencies of India's northeastern states and J&K, have almost, if not completely, been wiped out. Apart from a better counter-insurgency grid, the success in those areas is mostly attributed this thing - Armed Forces Special Powers Act. The law, which India uses as a last ditch effort to calm the mutinies, has been a bone of contention between the Indian govt and the opponents of it. According to the legislation, armed forces can conduct search raids, destroy property and even shoot a person just on the mere suspicion - and this with total legal impunity. However, permission to prosecute the alleged personnel can be sanctioned by the central govt but only after the accusations are proved not to be false. Those permissions are rarely given.
The idea of AFSPA and India's ongoing bloody engagement with Maoists has led many to raise this likely question: Why can't AFSPA be employed to defeat Maoists? The answer to this is simply, No !
Comparing the insurgencies of J&K and Northeastern states with the Naxalism would be the worst thing one could ever imagine. There are no parallels between them. Militancy in Kashmir and the one in Northeast can be compared slightly though. But to draw a similarity with Maoist problem just doesn't fits the picture.
Consider this: J&K is geographically situated at the northern fringe of India. It shares its borders with two most hostile adversaries India has fought multiple wars with - Pakistan & China. What's more? Not only does Pakistan claims the state wholly but China also claims substantial a part of it. Stakes there, are very much high.
In J&K, out of the many militant groups operating, only one is indigenous to the state ie. Hizbul Mujahideen. Rest of all are festered and pushed across LOC by Pakistani establishment. Here is the detailed report by Peter Chalk of RAND Corporation investigating the extent of Pakistan's support to militants groups of Kashmir.
Same is the case with militancy in the northeastern states. They lie on the edge of Indian state and are in the close proximity of China, of which a threat looms large on them. Insurgents of those areas also get support generally from outside India. Take a look at this report by Wasbir Hussain where he explores how NE militants largely get bases to thrive in countries like Myanmar and Bangladesh.
Now in contrast to this, Maoists generally get trained and armed from within India. For financial support, they rely of a range of things from looting Police stations to extorting money from NGO's. Many of them although are helped by NE militants, which can be cited to signify an external support, but that is too little to make a case of bringing them at par with militants of NE or J&K.
Secondly, the AFSPA was invoked in J&K and Northeast only when it was realised that local Police and other security forces were being overwhelmed. In Maoist areas, the number of forces taking on the insurgents are very huge and are very unlikely to be overwhelmed notwithstanding the incidents like Dantewanda. Apart from the large number of SPO's fighting them, there are 73 battalions of Central Paramilitay Forces (CPF), 31 Indian Reserve (IR) battalions and 6 battalions of the special Commando Battalions for Resolute Action (CoBRA), who are engaging the Maoists. The government of India has also started a news strategy of 'clear, hold and develop', according to which forces would oversee the govt-led development of the zones that are cleared off the Maoist control.
In conclusion, the situation of Maoist areas is grave though, but not as serious that would merit it for imposition of AFSPA. Having said this, one should not assume that the narrative justifies the continuance of AFSPA in the states like J&K. If the numbers by the govt are to be trusted, the insurgency in J&K is at all time low. Not only this, a recent statement by states' DGP, where in he declared districts like Srinagar and Budgam as 'militancy free' regions, also makes a clear case for AFSPA withdrawal. The culture of impunity that AFSPA has generated in those regions have also taken a toll on the local populace. And at least now, they do deserve a better life to live in.
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